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Abstract
Security-as-a-service is an emerging area in cloud computing. Traditionally, security approaches are service provider-centric and
provider-driven. In this paper, we propose a model for security-as-a-service using “crowdsourcing”. Though crowdsourcing has
been used to provide speciﬁc security services like browser security, detecting phishing attacks, detecting cybersecurity threats,
there has been no work which provides a uniﬁed framework to provide diﬀerent types of security veriﬁcation. Dispersed computing
power of devices is used to perform security veriﬁcations. This is done by subscribers in a collaborative way, using their idle
resources, in exchange of certain incentives. Our architecture guarantees anonymity of users who request service and the crowd
who contribute in veriﬁcation by using virtualization concepts and virtual machines. Moreover, we propose an approach for
managing these security veriﬁcation jobs, subscribers in a fault tolerant manner. To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to
propose a uniﬁed security-as-a-service framework using crowdsourcing, thus introducing a new research problem. We discuss a
number of applications, challenges and problems of crowdsourcing in security veriﬁcation.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Elhadi M. Shakshuki.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, anything-as-a-service1, such as Software-as-a-service, Infrastructure -as-a-service, Storage-as-a-
service, Platform-as-a-service, has received widespread popularity and attention; security services are not an excep-
tion. Cloud computing2, is a new technology of computing, providing these services as a utility. Cloud service
provider provides computing utility using an on-demand, pay-as-you-go model. Providing security to these services
is one of the forms of security-as-a-service. Security-as-a-service involves providing security to requesters, remotely.
It provides security by protecting the requesters from security attacks (prevention), detection of security attacks or
security breach (analysis), or taking countermeasures to minimize security attacks (cure). In this paper, we emphasize
on the analysis of the security breach method. Such security analyses can be expensive and time consuming if done by
a provider alone. These analyses are also prone to single point of failure and require high computing power. Thus, we
propose a Security-as-a-service architecture utilizing crowdsourcing3. Crowdsourcing is a technique of outsourcing
the task or job to an undeﬁned, large group of people. With increasing processing power of general purpose computers
and handheld devices, a group of people is able to perform any computation intensive task or can provide any service
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without having high end servers. In recent years, there has been a very high increase in mobile phones and other
handheld devices which have high computation power and memory. Most of these devices remain idle for large time
intervals, and can be suitably used for computations.
Crowdsourcing in computing has taken beneﬁt of this advancement and outsourced computation intensive task to
this crowd of virtual humans4 for performing computation using their intelligence (computers or mobile devices). In
this manner, collective intelligence of the crowd is used to perform computation intensive tasks. Though crowdsourc-
ing has been used to detect phishing attack5,6, scanning mobile apps7, rating websites for threats8, there is no work
which provides a general framework oﬀering security-as-a-service using crowdsourcing. We propose an architecture
of combining crowdsourcing and security-as-a-service, which to the best of our knowledge has not been proposed
earlier. Earlier works provide security veriﬁcations and auditing as a service9, but are disjoint and service-provider
centric and service-provider driven. In this paper, we design a uniﬁed, subscriber-centric and subscriber-driven ser-
vice model for security-as-a-service. With the collaboration of crowd; a provider can oﬀer SECaaS (SECurity-As-A-
Service)10, and perform security veriﬁcations without having high computing power at its end. All that needs to be
done at provider’s end is to maintain the journal of outsourced tasks/computation, computational nodes and available
resources, along with scheduling decision, node, job and resource management. All the security computation tasks
would be performed by the subscribers (computing systems). These subscribers may act as a requester for security
veriﬁcations or a computational node performing security computations, as per their requirement.
The problem we will be addressing is, how to eﬀectively and eﬃciently reduce the total cost of ownership (TCO)
of service provider using crowdsourcing, in order to provide security-as-a-service. Moreover, proposing a subscriber-
centric and subscriber-driven architecture, that enables subscribers to choose, manage, and monitor the security ser-
vices (subscriber-centric); and to perform the security computations (subscriber-driven). Proposing an “A´ la carte”
of parallel security services that can be performed in parallel by various subscribers at diﬀerent layers. Ensuring
anonymity and security of the the users who oﬀer their service will also be addressed in our architecture. Mainte-
nance of reward points for computational nodes (subscribers) to avoid free-riders (subscribers who only avail services,
but not share their resources in return) will also be addressed. We also introduce a new research problem and present
a number of challenges and applications of the architecture in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In next section, we present related work. Section 3 introduces
proposed architecture. In Section 4, design challenges are discussed. We discuss the future work and research issues
and conclude in Section 5.
2. Related Work
SECaaS began in early 1999, when companies like Postini, oﬀered web and email ﬁltering from spams and mal-
wares. Later, many Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs), such as Integrails, Megapath, Savvis, Secureworks,
Symantec, Verisign came to market and started managing organization’s network security devices (ﬁrewall, IDS) and
other security issues. Today SECaaS involves several services, such as, email ﬁltering, web content ﬁltering, vulnera-
bility management, identity-as-a service 11.
The term crowdsourcing was coined by Jeﬀ Howe and Mark Robinson in mid of 2006. Crowdsourcing is not
merely a buzzword, but is instead a strategic model to attract an interested, motivated crowd of individuals capable
of providing solutions of better quality and quantity to those that even traditional forms of business can do12. From
computing perspective, the amount of computing power and resource is dispersed among numerous computer users
has always the capacity to harness computation intensive problems. Instead of giving the problem to an organization
for solving, crowdsourcing gives the mechanism by which problem can be outsourced to the crowd having computing
power and resources to solve it. Few of the examples of crowdsourcing are Wikipedia, Google Mapathon‘13, thread-
less, InnoCentive. Though crowdsourcing is a new term in computing, it was present in form of volunteer computing
from long time. The idea behind volunteer computing13 is to form a virtual computing environment in which general
public voluntarily shares their computing resources (CPU cycles, storage, and network). Volunteer computing could
be viewed as a solution technology for crowd sourcing in computation domain. Volunteer computing is a powerful
way to form a distributed computing environment to perform large scale, computation intensive tasks on the com-
munity resource. There have been many volunteer computing projects, such as, the Great Internet Mersenne Prime
Search, SETI@home, Distributed.net. Volunteer computing has supplied several tera FLOPS (trillion FLoating-point
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Operations Per Second) of computing power from collaborative eﬀorts of general public, which is equivalent or more
than few of the super computers. There are several types of volunteer computing such as, private volunteer comput-
ing, commercial volunteer computing, and collaborative volunteer computing. We focus on collaborative volunteer
computing.
Recently, there has been a few applications of crowdsourcing in security. A work related to application of crowd-
sourcing in smart phones called AppScanner7. AppScanner analyzes various mobile phone applications for potential
privacy and security risks involved. AppScanner is a cloud-based service and gives users, information related to the
mobile application in an understandable form. Another related work is development of a toolkit14 using machine
learning and crowdsourcing. This toolkit is for detection of complex cyber threats and act as an extra defense mech-
anism against complex cyberthreat. Crowdsourcing for combating the phishing attacks has been proposed by5. The
paper uses human eﬀort and crowd intelligence to identify phishing and legitimate website to form a blacklist of URLs
with lower false positives. Another similar area of work detects web threats using the power of crowdsourcing, called
SmartNotes8. SmartNotes collects data related to websites such as, user votes and comments. Then, SmartNote, a
browser extension, uses these data to identify potential threats. In a very recent work,15 propose crowdsec, which is
built on the premise that security is not an individual requirement, but that of a group. The paper provides no imple-
mentation framework for achieving this. Most of the related works are limited to a speciﬁc area. We propose a more
generalized application of crowdsourcing in security-as-a-service model for the new or existing cloud (or physical
computer) users who want to verify their security and would like to verify their provider’s claimed security.
3. Proposed Architecture
Security veriﬁcation using crowdsourcing architecture assesses security vulnerabilities (such as vulnerabilities in
browser, ﬁrewall, network, shared storage, presence of rootkit/malware) of subscribers and involves porting these
tasks to other nodes. We will be using the term node, user, subscriber interchangeably. In our proposed architecture,
Fig. 1. SECaaS Provider Architecture
as shown in Figure 1, there are mainly two entities involved: SECaaS Provider and Subscriber.
SECaaS Provider: SECaaS Provider is the entity providing security services. It is the central authority. All the
requesters or subscriber ﬁrst get registered with the SECaaS provider and voluntarily share some of their resources for
security assessment and computation. On registering, each subscriber gets some base credit points, which can be used
to get security services. Provider also does journaling of available resource pool, outsourced task-computational node
mapping, credits/reward points per requester/node and updated resources. The task of porting security computation
and collecting the results is secure and anonymous; this is done by provider, using virtualization technology. SECaaS
provider ports the secure small sized hypervisor (Terra)16 to each computational node. This hypervisor provides a
trusted computing platform at each computational node and is controlled by the SECaaS provider. All the security
computation jobs are ported to the VM (Virtual Machine) of these hypervisors. Hypervisors could also be ported to
mobile devices (smart mobile phones, tablets), as mobile virtualization is already available. Detailed design for secure
tiny hypervisor for both computers and mobile devices is out of the scope of this paper.
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Figure 2(a) shows architecture of SECaaS provider. Provider has diﬀerent module for performing various tasks.
Such as:
Registration Manager: This module manages the subscriber registration process and their information. At the time
of registration or at any time later, subscriber can change their shared resource details. Registration Manager updates
this information with resource manager module. Once registration is done only subscriber can make use of Security
Services.
VM Builder: This module of provider builds a VM (Virtual Machine) as per the requested security job’s need. This
VM is later ported to the computational nodes.
Context Manager: This module modiﬁes and updates ported VM with new scripts and software, if required, for
any computations. It sets up the context at VM for security computations.
Job Scheduler: This module does job management. Jobs are ported to the deployed VM at computational nodes.
Prior to scheduling any job to computational node, it makes few of the decisions which are discussed later in this
paper in Section 4.
Fault Analyzer: Fault tolerance is managed by this module. Any suspected fault at the computational node is
reported at this module and further action is taken after analysis.
Incentive Banker: This module manages the incentives associated with each resource and job. At the time of
registration each subscriber is awarded with a default incentive, each time it is updated for jobs computed or security
service utilized.
Resource Manager: All the resources are managed by this module. Details about shared resources, allocated
resources, and resource pool details are recorded.
Security Services: This module gives “A´ la carte” of available security services which can be availed in parallel.
Security services are present in the form of layers which could be assessed independently and simultaneously.
Layered security architecture is being used in the proposed SECaaS architecture. A layered architecture is used to
provide independence in security veriﬁcation, for example, physical level security can be veriﬁed independent of the
network level or application level security. In physical level security veriﬁcation, the SECaaS provider exploits the
side or covert channels and veriﬁes the storage security. Network level security veriﬁcation includes veriﬁcation of
the virtualization aware network (if any), ﬁrewall status, IP calculation attacks and other network related attacks. In
platform level security, various security measures from the VMs (VM of requesters) perspective are veriﬁed such as
VM sprawling, VM rootkit attacks (blue pill attacks), ﬁngerprinting attack and other VM security measures (specially
in case of cloud users). Application level security is very wide and for simplicity the provider looks for identity and
access control mechanisms, malware detection, browser security, availability and stability of the applications.
Subscriber: In the proposed model, subscriber is a user who either helps SECaaS provider or avails its services.
Subscriber could be a cloud user having cloud computing resources or a normal user having physical devices (laptop,
computers, mobile phones, tablets) as computing resources. A subscriber can play two roles:
Requester: This is a subscriber, who needs to assess its security. Requester can choose the security services and
monitor the progress of their outsourced tasks. Requester can use reward points/incentives for availing these services.
Computational Nodes: These are idle requesters that do not seek any security services and voluntarily share their
resources for computation. Computational nodes, their computations and requester are anonymous to each other. Each
computation would earn a node some reward points, which improve the credibility of nodes. These points may also be
redeemed to use security services further. In addition, a subscriber (acting as computational nodes) can update (add
or remove) voluntarily shared resource anytime, by contacting SECaaS provider.
As shown in Figure 2 (b), hosted virtualization is used at all the computational nodes. Each computational node
has a secure tiny hypervisor which is ported by SECaaS provider and is present as an application on top of the host
operating system. All the computations are done in a VM which is in control of hypervisor. All these hypervisors are
controlled by the SECaaS provider using two channel: Data Channel and Control Channel, which are discussed later
in Section 4. Following is the list of steps followed in the architecture:
First, subscriber registers with the SECaaS provider and agrees to voluntarily share its resources (for example
memory, storage, CPU cores). Then, provider gives user base credit/reward points (as architecture is based on these
reward point transactions). The provider maintains a journal for these shared resources in the form of a resource
pool. Further, SECaaS provider sends some of the secure APIs (Application Programming Interface) for vulnerability
assessment to the requester. In addition to this, a tiny secure hypervisor is also ported to the subscriber to perform
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Fig. 2. Architecture of SECaaS Provider and Computational Node
security computations. These APIs would provide an interface to computational nodes and SECaaS provider for
communication and security computations. APIs can be viewed analogous to the software for remote access or
remote desktop, which gives control of one’s machine to other over Internet. These are one time process. Once
registered subscriber can avail services and can perform security computations. Requester selects security services
from provider’s A´ la carte. Since security computations might need authentication credentials of requester, requester
provides credentials to secure APIs which in turn would be transferred to the SECaaS provider. SECaaS provider
can later delegate the authentication to computational nodes. Afterwards SECaaS provider analyzes and parallelizes
the requests in computational jobs. Then, capacity planning for these jobs is carried out and incentive banker is
updated. From the shared resource pool, the provider looks for suitable computation node and outsources the security
computation jobs. Then computation node does veriﬁcation through APIs at requester and gets reward points for each
computation job. Reward points show credibility of the computation nodes and can be used to further avail security
services. Lastly, upon completion of computational job, result is reported to the SECaaS provider. Provider collects
and sends all the results for a service to the request and also updates resource pool and incentive banker.
Few of the assumptions made in the design are: SECaaS provider is well protected and secure. The APIs used
in communication with the nodes and requester are secure. Ported hypervisors are considered secure. The provider
has access to various vulnerability assessment tools and methods. Reward points cannot be modiﬁed by users. Cloud
subscribers have authority to delegate their resources for sharing. Computational nodes have minimum hardware
conﬁguration required to run provider’s APIs and hosting hypervisor.
4. Design Challenges
4.1. Computational Node Management
For computing, virtualization is used for management and as security enabler17 at computational nodes. Virtual-
ization can provide security as well as anonymity to computation, as the address space and other resources of virtual
machines (VMs) are isolated from the base platform. For better security of remote computations from native sys-
tem, a secured virtualization technique might be used such as vTPM18, Terra16, sHype19. We propose to use terra16
based light weighted (small size) hypervisor and only one VM for performing security computations at the remote
machines. Terra is a well studied model for virtualization security and ﬂexible architecture for trusted computing with
variable security requirements. In proposed architecture, prior to sending actual computations, a VM is ported to the
computational node. All the computations are ported to this VM or virtualized instance of computational platform.
In this manner, all the computations are running one level higher to physical computational node. This VM is secure
and is controlled remotely by the SECaaS provider. For controlling this VM, security provider uses a secure channel.
This channel is analogous to communication channel between hypervisor and management software. Two types of
channels are used for controlling the virtualized environment: Data Channel and Control/Management channel. Data
channel is used for porting data (scripts, inputs, programs, results) and management channel is used for managing the
infrastructure (heartbeat signals, VM migrations). SECaaS provider uses a Heartbeat signal for sensing the overall
health of the computational node. Heartbeat signals are used for several operations and able to diagnose the remote
node, using:
IsAlive Operation: Provider senses, whether computational node is reachable or not. If computational node is
powered oﬀ or unreachable (network/power outage), then provider can sense this using IsAlive operation.
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CurrentLoad Operation: Provider senses the current load information and resource utilization of the node. This
operation is used to sense the intermediate state of the computation. This works in much the same way as VM
introspection is done at hypervisor.
AvailableResource Operation: Provider extracts the information of available resources. This operation is used
before deploying any computation on the node. Heartbeat signals are sent to hypervisor and hypervisor reports back
the available resources at node for the new computational VM.
Proposed architecture relies on the resources voluntarily shared by various nodes. These resources are managed
in form of resource pool. Logs are managed for resources in use. These logs store information regarding shared
resources, owner, assigned job, available resources. This could be used to further assess resource pool properties.
Logs may be collected by signals of management channel such as heartbeat signal. Moreover, to perform security
computations and veriﬁcation tasks computational nodes would also need authentication parameters. We propose to
use proxy certiﬁcates such as X.509. Proxy certiﬁcates are used for delegating access rights. SECaaS provider would
have access rights for requester system, which could be delegated to the computational node using proxy certiﬁcates.
SECaaS provider would act as certiﬁcation authority in this case and would manage access control list, certiﬁcate
issue list, certiﬁcate revocation list.
4.2. Job Management
Various requesters request for security services. Provider receives requests and divides the request in form of
computational jobs. These jobs are ported to other computational nodes. Management of various jobs is an important
challenge in proposed design. There are various subtasks, which are involved in this task. Such as:
Job Speciﬁcation: Computational jobs are performed by external computational nodes, so speciﬁcation of job
can be ported to the nodes by: Direct Porting: Job speciﬁcation can be ported directly with the VM. This includes
already made scripts or programs. Input is readily available with these scripts. This method is used for initial setup of
computations at the nodes. Job Descriptor File (JDF) Porting: Job speciﬁcation can be ported in form of JSON (Java
Script Object Notation) ﬁle. This method is used when computation setup is already available. These ﬁles are used by
already deployed scripts. This is used for creating batch of similar computation jobs at a node.
Job Transfer: Transfer of computational job and associated information can be done by using FTP (File Transfer
Protocol) or other protocols, but this would expose a new attack surface on the computational node. Keeping this in
view, we propose to use HTTP and SSL (Secure Socket Layer) for transferring the jobs. Most of the ﬁrewall allows
HTTP traﬃc while FTP and other traﬃc may be blocked. This would keep the transfer secure as far as SSL is secure.
Scheduling Decision: Scheduling decision is made by SECaaS Provider. This decision is made on basis of:
- Job Type: Job type is an important criterion for scheduling decision. Job type may be new or existing. If new
request is given to SECaaS provider by requester then provider has to divide the request in parallel jobs. These jobs
are again compared with already ported jobs. If job is new and similar job has not been ported, then provider has to
do direct porting. If similar job is already ported then a new JDF for job need to be ported to an existing VM. This
would create a batch for similar job. For example, if a VM is already setup for a checking availability of requester,
then new jobs can be ported as JDF on the already setup VM.
- Scheduling Policy: Whole architecture is based on volunteer sharing of resources by computational nodes. There-
fore, we are following FCFS (First Come First Serve) policy for incoming requests. Further priority based scheduling
policy is adopted for the diﬀerent jobs in a request.
- Resource Characteristics: Various jobs may need diﬀerent types of resources. These resources have several
properties in the resource pool, such as: Static Characteristics - These involve ﬁxed characteristics of requested
resource, such as: required memory, needed processing power, cache. Dynamic Characteristics - These involve
varying characteristics of resources. Such as available resources in resource pool, resource location, network latency.
Considering above points and selecting a destination resource node from the resource pool, scheduling decision is
made. Job scheduler performs the task of scheduling. Job scheduler is always an interesting area of the computing
research, today we have many available job schedulers such as Condor, Gridway, sun grid engine. We propose to use
Condor job scheduler with this architecture, as Condor performs well in case of opportunistic computing (computing
using resources whenever they are available without all-time availability) and high-throughput computing (computing
to provide fault tolerance over prolong time periods and utilizing available resources eﬀectively). Scheduler replicates
computational job into multiple instances at SECaaS provider and outsource to computational nodes. Replication of a
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job is done to remove the dependency on a single computational node and to select the best among computed results.
Each job requires the same scheduling decision process. Best result of computation with highest number of security
risks is taken by the SECaaS provider. If all the results are same then any result might be taken, this decisions are
made by SECaaS provider. In this manner, collective intelligence of the crowd is used to verify security risk.
4.3. Fault Tolerance
Fault tolerance is one of the design challenges in proposed model for smooth running of the computations. In
our proposed model, as shown in Figure 2 c, following components are introduced to implement proactive20 fault
tolerance:
- Fault Oracle: At every computational node, fault oracle is present in hypervisor. This fault oracle predicts
occurrence of fault and alarms the SECaaS provider.
- Fault Analyzer: SECaaS provider is equipped with a fault analyzer. Alarms are analyzed by this fault analyzer,
on the basis of predeﬁned fault policies. Actions are sent to the scheduler for realization.
- Fault policy: Fault policy is a mapped data structure of event and action. Each alarm is matched with the existing
policies and appropriate action is taken. For a new type of alarm by default live migration is taken as preventive action.
Each action is sent in response to fault analyzer.
Job Scheduler performs the action received from fault analyzer. Actions may involve live migration of the com-
putation (computing VM) to a healthy computation node. This involves all decisions of job management, such as
scheduling decision, job transfer decision, and job speciﬁcation decision. After selecting a healthy computational
node live migration is started. This involves following steps: Firstly, a temporary clone of computing VM of faulty
node is made and is saved at SECaaS. Then, all the intermediate results, register values, PC (Program Counter) values
are saved and migration is started from the faulty node to healthy computational node. One checkpoint is managed at
the faulty node VM, which states that all prior results, register values, PC values have been saved. Afterwards, VM
image is sent to the healthy node along with the intermediate results, register values, PC values. VM is powered on at
the new healthy node. At this stage, faulty node VM is suspended and all the results, register, PC values are brought
to the new healthy node VM. Now at this point, all the computations are started and resumed from the new healthy
node’s VM. Temporary cloned copy might be used if the migration fails. Although it would have few computational
penalties, however task could be resumed without starting all over again. In some case, other computational nodes
might already have the setup. Hence, live migration is not required, then intermediate results could be stored by the
SECaaS provider and a new JDF could be prepared and sent to a new healthy node and parameter seeping could be
done.
4.4. Incentive Management
Incentive management is one of the crucial design challenges to address. Proper incentive management1 would
motivate the subscribers to actively participate in the model. In our proposed model, incentives would be based on:
shared resource type (CPU, Storage), shared resource units (Number of CPUs, Storage size), Job type, job units
(number of job requests served), time served, number of completed jobs. We also propose to design a function of
penalty. Penalties would be deducted from the incentive, in case of failure of jobs or termination of job. Termination
of job might cause restart of the job at new computational node, would cause delay in security veriﬁcation.
Used and allocated resource information, time served, number of completed jobs could be fetched using virtual
machine introspection (VMI) feature of virtualized environment. We modiﬁed the module doing VMI for collecting
and sending only required information. All the information required for incentive calculations, at each computational
node, are fetched and sent through the management channel to the SECaaS provider. Further, SECaaS would use this
information for incentive and penalty calculations. Moreover, free security updates could be immediate motivating
factor for users in our scenario.
1 Incentive management is non-trivial and not easy problem to simply address in real world. This is another area of research that we are exploring,
speciﬁcally for concrete reward points and incentive management in crowd sourcing environment.
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5. Conclusion and Future Work
Security-as-a-service is a critical computing utility that saves subscriber from the hassle of maintaining its own se-
curity. We have proposed a uniﬁed framework to oﬀer subscriber-centric and subscriber-driven security services. The
emphasis of this paper includes using crowdsourcing for providing security-as-a-service. The collaboration of crowd
in voluntarily sharing their computing resources would form a resource pool equivalent to some of the supercomput-
ers that too without paying anything extra. Few of the beneﬁts of proposed model are: reduced initial cost, reduced
total cost of ownership of hardware for provider and from subscriber’s view point utilization of free CPU cycles for
costless security veriﬁcation. This resource pool would be used by crowd for performing security computations. We
also uncovered the use of virtualization for providing secured computing base and easy management of jobs, fault
and resources. The proposed framework also manages incentives for motivating legit users and discouraging free
riders. Proposed model could be used as an unbiased, free security analyzer and veriﬁer which use crowd’s collective
intelligence. Model is beneﬁcial for both service provider and service subscribers. This conﬂuence of virtual humans
can keep them safe and update them about the security risks. We plan to extend our work by developing a working
model of proposed architecture in public domain. Our future work includes looking into few of the research issues
involved here. Such as, crowd selection for the computation task, providing justiﬁable incentives to maximize beneﬁt
of users and at the same time demotivate free-riders.
References
1. Tsai, W.T., Sun, X., Balasooriya, J.. Service-oriented cloud computing architecture. In: Information Technology: New Generations (ITNG),
2010 Seventh International Conference on. IEEE; 2010, p. 684–689.
2. Armbrust, M., Fox, A., Griﬃth, R., Joseph, A.D., Katz, R., Konwinski, A., et al. A view of cloud computing. Communications of the
ACM 2010;53(4):50–58.
3. Howe, J.. The rise of crowdsourcing. Wired magazine 2006;14(6):1–4.
4. Lamarche, F., Donikian, S.. Crowd of virtual humans: a new approach for real time navigation in complex and structured environments. In:
Computer Graphics Forum; vol. 23. Wiley Online Library; 2004, p. 509–518.
5. Liu, G., Xiang, G., Pendleton, B.A., Hong, J.I., Liu, W.. Smartening the crowds: computational techniques for improving human
veriﬁcation to ﬁght phishing scams. In: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security. ACM; 2011, p. 8.
6. Moore, T., Clayton, R.. Evaluating the wisdom of crowds in assessing phishing websites. Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2008;
:16–30.
7. Amini, S., Lin, J., Hong, J., Lindqvist, J., Zhang, J.. Towards scalable evaluation of mobile applications through crowdsourcing and
automation (cmu-cylab-12-006). Tech. Rep.; Carnegie Mellon University; 2012.
8. Shariﬁ, M., Fink, E., Carbonell, J.G.. SmartNotes: Application of crowdsourcing to the detection of web threats. In: Systems, Man, and
Cybernetics (SMC), 2011 IEEE International Conference on. IEEE; 2011, p. 1346–1350.
9. Sekar, V., Maniatis, P.. Veriﬁable resource accounting for cloud computing services. In: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Cloud
computing security workshop. ACM; 2011, p. 21–26.
10. Hussain, M., Abdulsalam, H.. SECaaS: security as a service for cloud-based applications. In: Proceedings of the Second Kuwait Conference
on e-Services and e-Systems. ACM; 2011, p. 8.
11. Allen, J., Gabbard, D., May, C., Hayes, E., Sledge, C.. Outsourcing managed security services. Tech. Rep.; DTIC Document; 2003.
12. Kittur, A., Chi, E., Pendleton, B.A., Suh, B., Mytkowicz, T.. Power of the few vs. wisdom of the crowd: Wikipedia and the rise of the
bourgeoisie. World Wide Web 2007;1(2):19.
13. Sarmenta, L.F.. Volunteer computing. Ph.D. thesis; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; 2001.
14. Fink, E., Shariﬁ, M., Carbonell, J.G.. Application of machine learning and crowdsourcing to detection of cybersecurity threats. In:
Proceedings of the US Department of Homeland Security Science Conference–Fifth Annual University Network Summit, Washington, DC.
2011, .
15. Dong, Z., Garg, V., Camp, L.J., Kapadia, A.. Pools, clubs and security: Designing for a party not a person. In: New Security Paradigms
Workshop. 2012, .
16. Garﬁnkel, T., Pfaﬀ, B., Chow, J., Rosenblum, M., Boneh, D.. Terra: A virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing. In: ACM
SIGOPS Operating Systems Review; vol. 37. ACM; 2003, p. 193–206.
17. Brakensiek, J., Dro¨ge, A., Botteck, M., Ha¨rtig, H., Lackorzynski, A.. Virtualization as an enabler for security in mobile devices. In:
Proceedings of the 1st workshop on Isolation and integration in embedded systems. ACM; 2008, p. 17–22.
18. Perez, R., Sailer, R., van Doorn, L.. vTPM: virtualizing the trusted platform module. In: Proc. 15th Conf. on USENIX Security Symposium.
2006, p. 305–320.
19. Sailer, R., Valdez, E., Jaeger, T., Perez, R., Van Doorn, L., Griﬃn, J.L., et al. sHype: Secure hypervisor approach to trusted virtualized
systems. Techn Rep RC23511 2005;.
20. Nagarajan, A.B., Mueller, F., Engelmann, C., Scott, S.L.. Proactive fault tolerance for hpc with xen virtualization. In: Proceedings of the
21st annual international conference on Supercomputing. ACM; 2007, p. 23–32.
